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FEDERAL CONTROL OF WETLANDS: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
CORPS' REGULATIONS UNDER § 404 OF THE FWPCA
I. Introduction
Section 4041 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendrhents2
(FWPCA) vests the United States Army Corps of Engineers with primary
authority to regulate dredge-and-fill operations in "navigable waters" of the
United States. Historically, the Corps' duties emanated from an interest in
preventing navigational obstructions and facilitating interstate commerce.' The
Corps' recent powers under the FWPCA, however, derive from a broader and
overriding concern for environmental protection. 4
The Corps' § 404 jurisdiction over regulating dredge and fill activities is
limited to "navigable waters."5 Section 502 (7) of the FWPCA defines the term
"navigable waters!' as "waters of the United States, including the territorial
seas." This explanatory section enlarges the scope of the Corps' powers under §
404 by excluding traditional considerations of navigability which had formerly
limited the Corps' regulation.7 As late as April 1975, however, the Corps
retained navigational considerations in its regulations which defined the scope
of the Corps' authority under the FWPCA. The Corps' regulations restricted
that agency's powers to regulation of only those waters of the United States
except the territorial seas which are subject to inundation by the mean high
tidal waters, and those waters susceptible to interstate commerce in the past,
present, or future."
Then, in Natural Resources Defense Council v. Calloway,9 the federal
District Court for the District of Columbia revoked the Corps' regulations as
unlawfully enacted in derogation of the Corps' statutory duties. While Calloway,
a memorandum opinion, is not of factual importance, its holding is significant
1 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (Supp. II, 1972).

2 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-376 (Supp. II, 1972).

3 The Corps' powers to regulate dredging and filling originated under the Rivers and
Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-09 (1970). The Corps' powers under the 1899 Act
were initially intended to relate only to navigable and commercial considerations. Guthrie v.
Alabama By-Products Co., 328 F. Supp. 1140, 1146-48 (N.D. Ala. 1971). See United States
v. Pennsylvania Indus. Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. 655, 664-66 (1973); United States v. Standard
Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224, 226-27 (1966); United States v. Kennebec Log Driving Co., 491
F.2d 562, 565 (1st Cir. 1973); Potomac River Ass'n v. Seamanship School, Civil No. 73-789-Y
(D. Md., filedl April 11, 1975); United States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665, 669-70 (M.D.
Fla. 1974); Lavagnino v. Porto-Mix Concrete, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 323, 325-26 (D. Colo.
1971); Chambers-Liberty Counties Navig. Dist. v. Parker Bros. & Co., 263 F. Supp. 602,
606-07 (S.D. Tex. 1967); Hoyer, Corps of Engineers Dredge and Fill jurisdiction:Buttressing
a Citadel Under Siege, 26 U. FA. L. Rmv. 19, 21 (1973).
4 E.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (Supp. II, 1972) which provides: "The objective of this
Act is to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation's
waters."
5 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (Supp. II, 1972).
6 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (Supp. II, 1972).
7 Prior to the enactment of the FWPCA, the Corps' powers to regulate dredging and
filling were limited to those activities which actually took place in navigable waters or which
took place in waters which were susceptible to interstate commerce after reasonable improvements were made. See text accompanying notes 31-37 infra.
8 33 C.F.R. § 209.260 (1974).
9 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975).
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since it required the Corps to publish new regulations that would better effectuate
the full statutory mandate of the FWPCA. The Corps responded by publishing
final interim regulations on July 26, 1975.10 These regulations, a product of
intense debate and controversy, 1 implemented a dramatic expansion of the
regulatory power of that agency.
It is clear that the motivating force behind the compelled expansion of
the Corps' regulations was the decision to use § 404 as a federal mechanism
for wetlands control. To assess the effectiveness of this decision, it is necessary
to determine the impact of the expanded regulations on the Corps' powers to
regulate wetlands. The scope of the Corps' jurisdiction, as expanded by Calloway, should be examined and compared with the Corps' prior jurisdiction under
the FWPCA, and the Corps' traditional powers under prior statutes. It i0 also
necessary to identify the major problems and deficiencies of the expanded regulations, and to evaluate possible improvements and solutions in order to intelligently evaluate the advisability of using § 404 to achieve a federal wetlands
program.
II. Justification for the Expansion: Protection of Wetlands
The courts have justified the expansion of the Corps' jurisdiction beyond
navigational limits on the ground that § 404 both authorizes and requires the
Corps to exercise broad regulatory powers. For example, the Calloway court
ordered expansion of the Corps' jurisdictional regulations to fulfill the full statutory mandate of the FWPCA." Similarly, other courts which extended the
Corps' § 404 powers on an ad hoc basis have reasoned that both legislative intent
as expressed in statutory language and the legislative history of the FWPCA
necessitated the expansion."
Underlying these judicial interpretations of legislative intent is an increasing concern for the preservation of the nation's wetlands. Not surprisingly, the
six cases which enlarged the Corps' powers on an ad hoc basis concerned regulaion of pollution in wetland areas. 4 Moreover, statements of Congressmen

10 40 Fed. Reg. 31320 (1975).
11 The Corps initially responded to the Galloway court order on May 6, 1975, by publishing
four proposed alternative regulations, 40 Fed. Reg. 19766 (1975). The Corps received mostly
adverse comments on the proposed regulations from environmental groups and governmental
agencies. Current Developments, 6 BNA ENVIRONMENTAL REP. 449-50 (1975). The Corps
and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) also sharply disagreed on the meaning and
scope of the proposed regulations. Id. at 145-46, 203-04. The Water Resources Subcommittee
of the House Committee on Public Works and Transportation attempted to resolve the problem
by allowing the Corps, the EPA, and other interested parties to testify in hearings held on
July 15, 16, and 22, 1975. 121 CONG. RE. 873 (daily ed. July 15, 1975); 121 CONG. REC.
883 (daily ed. July 16, 1975); 121 CONG. REC. 927 (daily ed. July 22, 1975).
12 392 F. Supp. at 686.
13 P.F.Z. Properties, Inc. v. Train, 393 F. Supp. 1370 (D.D.C. 1975); United States v.
Smith, Civil No. 74-34-NN (E.D. Va., filed Apr. 21, 1975); Weizmann v. Corps of Engineers,
Civil No. 74-469-CIV-WM (S.D. Fla., filed Feb. 12, 1975); United States v. Sexton Cove
Estates, Civil No. 74-1067-CIV-WM (S.D. Fla., filed Feb. 6, 1975); Leslie Salt v. Froehlke,
Civil No. 73-2294-WTS (N.D. Cal., filed Dec. 19, 1974); United States v. Holland, 373 F.
Supp. 665 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
14 Id.
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advocating the use reflect an intent to use an expanded § 404 as the primary
federal mechanism for protecting national wetland resources."
The major impetus for the judicial and legislative involvement in this area
is due to the substantial ecological value of the wetlands and similar areas. Wetlands are essential components of estuaries, which are partially enclosed bodies
of water which are sensitive biological systems."0 Estuaries perform vital functions, including purification of water, conversion of pollutants to nutrients and
oxygen, and preservation of vital spawning areas for aquatic life." Common
construction activities in wetland areas, such as dredging and filling, disrupt the
delicate balance of the ecosystem and impede the estuary's performance of its
vital and restorative functions.18 Current statistics show that as a result of such
dredge and fill operations, the number of the nation's wetlands has been significantly reduced; this corresponds to an overall trend of rapidly vanishing wetland
9

areas.1

An additional reason for the concern for regulation of such dredge and fill
activities is to prevent wetlands from becoming a source of pollutant discharge
into adjacent or connected bodies of waters. The construction work involved in
dredging and filling in wetlands not only destroys the ecological balance of the
immediate area, but may also result in a discharge of pollutants which are carried into larger waters and streams, causing siubstantial pollution to such navigable waters.20
Recognition of the vanishing wetlands problem and the need to prevent
further destruction of wetlands and connected waters prompted corrective action
on the part of state legislatures and Congress in the late 1960's. Wetlands acts
designed to preserve and affirmatively improve those vital regions were enacted
by the states, beginning with Massachusetts in 1965."' Federal efforts, primarily
directed through the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899,22 consisted of regulation
of the dredge and fill activities which polluted and destroyed wetland areas.
The FWPCA, enacted in 1972, provides a new and more environmentally
oriented vehicle for federal protection of wetland regions. The advantage of the
FWPCA over its predecessor, the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, is that the
FWPCA was enacted for the primary purpose of controlling environmental
15 121 CoNG. REc. 9760 (daily ed. June 5, 1975) (remarks of Senator Muskie); 121 CoNG.
Rac. 4772 (daily edgjune 2, 1975) (remarks of Representative Ottinger). But see 121 CONG.
Rac. 5408 (daily ed. June 12, 1975) (remarks of Representative Bauman).
16 United States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665, 675 (M.D. Fla. 1974). See generally
Kingham, State and Local Wetlands Regulation: The Problem of Taking Without Just
Compensation, 58 VA. L. Rav. 876 (1973); Teclaff, The Coastal Zone-Control Over
Encroachments Into the Tidelands, 2 ENVIRONMENT L. Rav. 618 (1971).
17 Id. See also Statement of Alvin Alm, Asst. Admin. for Planning & Management of the
EPA Before the Subcomm. on Water Resources of the House Comm. on Public Works &
Transp., 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1975); Statement of Natural Resources Defense Council Before
Subcomm. on Public Works & Transp., 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1975) [hereinafter cited as NRDC
Statement].
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199, 204 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971);
Hoyer, supra note 5, at 34; 2 A Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1495 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Legislative History].
21 MAss. ANN. LAWs ch. 130, §§ 27A, 105 (1972).
22 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-09 (1970).
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In contrast, the 1899 Act was enacted primarily to

prevent obstructions of navigation and to enhance the flow of interstate commerce." Consideration of environmental impact was permitted in assessing
permit applications under the 1899 Act,25 while similar evaluations are mandatory under the FWPCA." Although the Corps' initial limitation of its jurisdiction under § 404 to navigability considerations did restrict federal regulation
to wetlands located above the mean high waters, this restriction was removed by
the Galloway court and the corrected Corps' regulations. This expanded jurisdiction under § 404 of the FWPCA can only be seen as a means chosen by courts
and legislatures for the protection of wetlands.
III. Background of the Corps' Jurisdiction
A. Navigability and the 1899 Act
A consideration of the historical background of the Corps' powers to regulate dredging and filling is necessary to understand the reasons for choosing §
404 as the primary vehicle for wetlands control. Section 404, as expanded by
Galloway, defines the scope of the Corps' jurisdiction more broadly than did
prior statutory definitions. An examination of previous historical limitations on
the Corps' powers illustrates the significance of the expansion by § 404, and
reveals the advantages of using this broader definition of the Corps' jurisdiction
to achieve effective wetlands control.
The Corps' authority to regulate dredging and filling in navigable waters
originated under the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899.27 The 1899 Act was enacted under Congress' commerce clause powers," and was strengthened when
the Supreme Court held in Gibbons v. Ogden29 that powers under the commerce
clause include the authority to regulate navigation."
The Corps' regulatory jurisdiction under the 1899 Act was limited to
activities which took place in "navigable waters."'" The Corps' statutory responsibilities were initially defined by the Supreme Court in The Daniel Ball, 2
where the navigability of waters was determined by a "navigability-in-fact"
test. Waters were deemed navigable under this test when they were actually
used or were susceptible to use, in their ordinary condition, as highways for inter23 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (Supp. II, 1972).
24 See cases cited in note 3 supra.
25 Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199, 211 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971).
See United States v. Pennsylvania Indus. Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. 655 (1973); United States
v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224 (1966); United States v. Republican Steel Corp., 362
U.S. 482 (1960).
26 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b) (Supp. I, 1972).
27 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-09 (1970).
28 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.

29 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). See Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1877); Veazie v.
Moor, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 597 (1852); Norris v. Boston, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 282 (1849).

30 The Court has further held that under the commerce clause Congress has the power,
to keep navigable waters free and open, and to provide sanctions against obstructions. E.g.,
Wickard v. Filburn, 37 U.S. 111 (1942); Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713
(1865).
31 See cases cited in note 3 supra.
32 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870).
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state or foreign commerce. The test of navigability was gradually expanded by
judicial decision to include waters which had sustained navigation in the past but
which were no longer capable of navigation in their ordinary condition," and
waters which could be capable of sustaining navigation in the future if reasonable
improvements were made."5 The Corps revised its regulations for the issuance
of permits under the 1899 Act" to correspond to these changes; by September
1972, the Corps' regulations defined navigable waters as those waters which have
been in the past, or may be in the present or future, susceptible to interstate or
foreign commerce."
B. The FWPCA
The FWPCA, enacted in October 1972, supplemented Corps regulation
under the 1899 Act, reflecting a new consideration of environmental impact to
federal regulatory powers. 8 While courts had recognized that the Corps could
and should properly consider ecological factors in evaluating permit applications
under the 1899 Act,3" § 404 of the FWPCA makes environmental considerations
mandatory."' The section also requires the Corps to defer to the environmental
recommendations of appropriate federal and state agencies, such as the United
States Fish and Wildlife Service.4
Moreover, § 404 further broadens the jurisdiction of the Corps over
navigable waters. Significantly, FWPCA § 502(7) omits the word "navigable"
from its definition of the term "navigable waters."42 Legislative history reveals
that Congress intended to expand the Corps' regulatory jurisdiction beyond traditional limitations. 3 However, when Calloway was decided the Corps' regulations did not comply with the new legislative definition, but continued to operate
under the same jurisdictional limits of navigability as defined by the courts
44
construing the 1899 Act.
33

Id. at 563.

34 See, e.g., United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940); United
States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64 (1931); Economy Power & Light Co. v. United States, 256 U.S.
113 (1921); United States v. Rio-Grande Dam & Irrig. Co., 174 U.S. 690, 698 (1899); The
Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430 (1874).
35 United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 408 (1940); Rochester
Gas & Elec. Corp. v. FPC, 344 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1965).
36 The Corps' permit program under § 13 of the 1899 Act which regulated the dumping
of refuse into navigable waters was established on December 26, 1970, pursuant to Exec.
Order No. 11574, 3 C.F.R. 188 (1971).
37 33 C.F.R. § 209.260 (1972).
38 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a) (Supp. II, 1972).
39 See cases cited in note 25 supra.
40 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b) (Supp. II, 1972).
41 See Memorandum of Understanding Between the Secretary of the Interior and the
Secretary of the Army of July 13, 1867, Appendix B, Corps' Regulation 290.260, 40 Fed. Reg.

31341 (1975).

42 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (Supp. II, 1972).
43 See 1 Legislative History, supra note 20, at 250. The Joint Explanatory Statement of
the Committee of Conference stated the reason for the deletion of the term "navigable" in

§ 404:

The conferees fully intend that the term "navigable waters" be given the broadest
possible constitutional interpretation unencumbered by agency determinations which
may have been made or may be made for administrative purposes.
S. REP. No. 92-1236, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 327 (1972).

44

33 C.F.R. § 209.260 (1974).
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IV. The Expansion of the Corps' Powers Under the FWPCA
A. Extent of the Change
The new regulations promulgated by the Corps pursuant to Calloway encompass some bodies of water that have never before been brought under federal control,45 and others that have been federally regulated only pursuant to
other recent judicial decisions." ° This crucial change reflects a broader interpretation of those bodies of water covered by the FWPCA definition of "waters of
' 47
the United States.
1. Problems with Traditional Limitations of Navigability: Controlling the
Source of Pollution
Under the Corps' revoked regulations, navigable waters did not include
waters in nontidal rivers which were above the "ordinary high water mark,' 8
nor waters in tidal areas which were located above the mean high water line.49
The practical effect of this administrative definition was to exclude many freshand saltwater wetlands, as well as most nonprimary tributaries of navigable
waters, from Corps' control; thus the Corps' overall effort to prevent degradation of the aquatic environment was frequently crippled.5" For example, dredge
and fill work may result in the discharge of pollutants in remote tributaries or
wetlands which could set off a chain of destruction resulting in substantial pollution to waters which are navigable and regulable. 5 Consequently, it became
evident that if the Corps was to fulfill its statutory responsibilities, it was "essential that discharge of pollutants be controlled at the source."5 2 However,
under the old definition if the tributary or marsh area was nonnavigable, it was
nonregulable.
The courts which construed the FWPGA prior to the Calloway decision
recognized this weakness, and in a few cases rejected the navigational limits in
45 The Corps stated in itsexplanatory notes which accompanied the July 25, 1975 publication of its new regulations:
We recognize that this program, in its effort to protect water quality to the full
extent of the commerce clause, will extend Federal regulation over discharges of
dredged or fill material to many areas that have never before been subject to
Federal permits or to this form of water quality protection.
40 Fed. Reg. 31320 (1975). The Corps added that it intended to cope with the expanded
areas of regulation through an intensive public information campaign to make the public
aware of the requirements of § 404 of the FWPCA. Id.
46 See cases cited in note 13 supra.
47 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (Supp.II,1972).
48 33 C.F.R. § 209.260 (1974) provided:
The "ordinary high water mark" on nontidal rivers must be determined by the
ordinary flows of the river; neither peak nor flood stages can be included, nor the
lowest stages of flow.
See text accompanying note 62 infra.
49 33 C.F.R. § 209.260(k) (1974).
50 United States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665, 670 (M.D. Fla. 1974). The defendants
argued unsuccessfully that navigable waters under the FWPCA did not include a tributary of
a tributary of a navigable stream in United States v. Ashland Oil & Transp. Co., 364 F.
Supp. 349 (W.D. Ky. 1973), aff'd, 504 F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1974).
51 Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199, 204 (5th Cir. 1970); Hoyer, supra note 3, at 34.
52 Legislative History, supra note 20, at 1495.
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favor of regulation and abatement of pollution at its source.5" The most notable
of these cases is United States v. Holland,5 4 where Judge Krentzman of the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida held that the
artificial mangrove canals and mosquito ditches which were located one inch
above the mean high waters were within the Corps' regulatory jurisdiction. The
court rejected the mean high water boundary in favor of an ad hoc approach;
each case, it stated, must be examined on its own facts to determine whether
Congress intended to regulate the area in dispute. 5
In Holland, the court concluded that statutory language and legislative
history of the FWPCA evidenced an intent on the part of Congress to control the
quality of all the nation's waters by using the broadest possible definitions of
"waters of the United States."56 The court also cited environmental authority
which designated the areas in question-mangrove wetlands and canals-as a
critically valuable zone.5" Relying on the broad purpose of the FWPCA to
regulate in all waters of the United States and the ecological importance of the
dredged and filled area, the Holland court concluded that the Corps had jurisdiction under the FWPCA.
2. Procedural Problems with the Ad Hoc Approach: Administrative
Efficiency and Due Process
The ad hoc approach of the Holland court formulates no general guidelines
which delineate the scope of the Corps' enlarged jurisdiction. Congressional
intent as expressed in statutory language and legislative history also provides no
suggestion as to the outer limits on the expansion. " Although each ad hoc
determination may expand the Corps' authority in a specific area, no clear-cut
parameters are established.
This indefinite scope of Corps jurisdiction is a serious problem for two
reasons. First, specific boundaries of the Corps' expanded jurisdiction are necessary for the Corps to effectively implement the § 404 program. The Corps
requires an easily discernible scope of authority to facilitate permit processing.
The initial determination of jurisdiction should be accomplished quickly so that
See cases cited in note 13 supra. See generally Sun Enterprises, Ltd. v. Train, 394 F.
211 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); United States v. Ashland Oil & Transp. Co., 364 F. Supp. 349
Ky. 1973), aff'd, 504 F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1974).
373 F. Supp. 665 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
Id. at 673.
Id. at 671-74.
Estuaries are not only highly productive in organic matter, but are also valuable in
replenishing oxygen for the atmosphere [citations omitted]. . . . The FWPCA
embodies the realization that pollution of these areas may be ecologically fatal.
Id. at 675.
58 The Holland court recognized this lack of guidelines in the statutory language and
legislative history of the FWPCA: "Even though it seems certain that Congress sought to
broaden federal jurisdiction under the Act, it did, so in a manner that appears calculated to
force courts to engage in verbal acrobatics." 373 F. Supp. at 671. Another author concluded:
The omission of "navigability" from the definition of "navigable waters" bears all
the earmarks of deliberate ambiguity designed to paper over unreconciled disagreements among the conferees over the desired scope of federal jurisdiction. In this
situation, any attempt to divine a congressional intent is an unrealistic venture.
53
Supp.
(W.D.
54
55
56
57

Zener, The Federal Law of Water Pollution Control, in
91 (E.Dolgin & T. Guilbert eds. 1974).
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the Corps can devote the majority of its time and resources to assessing the
merits of individual permit applications. Thus, the ad hoc approach which may
work well in an individual judicial proceeding is too cumbersome and indefinite
for administrative purposes.
Secondly, due process may require definite limitations on the expansion of
the Corps' jurisdiction. In United States v. Pennsylvania Industrial Chemical
Corp.,59 the Supreme Court held that the defendant corporation could rely upon
Corps regulations which defined the scope of its regulatory powers. The Court
found that citizens are entitled to fair warning in the regulations as to the kind
of conduct that is made criminal by the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899.6" The
requirements of due process, as formulated by the Court in Pennsylvania Industrial Chemical Corp., are applicable to § 404 of the FWPCA since a violation
of § 404 may result in criminal sanctions under § 308.61 The ad hoc approach
of the Holland court establishes no specific delineation of the Corps' powers and
thereby fails to give fair warning as to what conduct constitutes a violation of
§ 404. Such an approach provides the citizen with no guidelines for distinguishing between legal and illegal conduct, because it suggests no outer limit to the
Corps' § 404 authority. Therefore, specific limitations on the Corps' § 404 power
may be necessary to satisfy the notice requirements of the due process clause that
were articulated by the Supreme Court in Pennsylvania Industrial Chemical
Corp.
3. Corps' Regulatory Changes Resulting from the Calloway Decision
The Corps' new regulations, mandated by Calloway, implement the judicial
trend of expanding the Corps' § 404 jurisdiction represented by the Holland
case. These changes in the new regulations avoid the problem of controlling the
source of pollutants which plagued the earlier regulations. Control of formerly
unregulable sources of pollution is achieved in several ways in the new regulations. First, the Corps is authorized to regulate all tributaries up to their "headwaters" (up to the point at which the water flow is less than five cubic feet per
second), and landward to the "ordinary high water mark"6 (landward to the
point on the shore that is inundated by water 25 percent of the time). As a
result of these definitions, the Corps may regulate many smaller feeder streams
which carry pollutants into navigable waters, and more effectively control discharge at its direct source.
Secondly, the new regulations confront the source control problem in
another necessary area. Definitional subsection (d) provides for the regulation of
artificially created canals that are used for recreational or other water-related
purposes. 4 This is an important change, since the Corps had previously refused
59 411 U.S. 655 (1973).
60 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-09 (1970).
61 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (Supp. II, 1972).
62 See Corps' Regulation 209.260(d) (2) (ii) (a), 40 Fed. Reg. 31325 (1975).
63

Id.

64

See Corps' Regulation 209.260(d) (2) (d), 40 Fed. Reg. 31325 (1975).
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to regulate artificial canals which often act as repositories for coliform bacteria,
oil, grease, pesticides, and organic debris.65
The Corps' new regulations also overcame the indefiniteness problem that
was inherent in the ad hoc approach as endorsed by the Holland court; there are
specific limitations on the Corps' § 404 authority. In tidal areas, the traditional
demarcation of the mean high water line is replaced by a "vegetable indicator."'6
This change is intended to expand the Corps' regulatory powers to include many
wetlands and marshy areas that had not been subject to federal control because
of their location above the mean high waters.
While the use of a vegetation line in delimiting the scope of the Corps'
expanded authority eliminates most of the indefiniteness problems, it is still not
sufficiently specific. The general vegetation line as a boundary is "vastly too
vague ... reflecting surprisingly small understanding of the biota of the wetlands."67 The Corps' regulations, by using the vegetation index, expand the
Corps' jurisdiction over areas periodically inundated by saline or brackish waters
and normally characterized by the presence of salt or brackish water vegetation
capable of growth and reproduction. 68 However, many species of wetlands
vegetation do not require periodic inundation for growth and survival, so it is
unclear whether the new regulations actually encompass these species.69 Furthermore, if the vegetation index is strictly construed, it would rarely extend the
Corps' jurisdiction far beyond the mean high water line.7" This interpretation
would clearly conflict with the Calloway decision, which mandated the expansion
of the Corps' jurisdiction beyond the mean high water line.7 '
The uncertainty of the vegetation index can be solved by supplementing
the Corps' regulations with a list of specific vegetation that falls within the
category of an indicator specie for the purposes of regulation.72 The adoption
of such a definitive list of dominant plant species would eliminate the uncertainty,
and ensure that the Corps' jurisdiction does extend beyond the mean high water
line to reach identified species of vegetation.
The subsections which expand the Corps' jurisdiction over all tributaries of
navigable waters are also sufficiently definite in terms of delimiting the scope of
the Corps' powers. Areas which do not meet minimal flow standards as defined
by the terms "headwaters" and "ordinary high water mark" are excluded from
65 HOUSE COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS, OUR THREATENED ENVIRONMENT: FLORIDA AND
THE GULF OF MExico, H.R. REP. No. 1396, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 16-23 (1974).

66 40 Fed. Reg. 31324-25 (1975).
67 Statement of Hon. Richard Ottinger Before the Subcomm. on Water Resources of the
House Comm. on Public Works & Transp., 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1975).
68 Corps' Regulation 209.260(d) (2) (b), 40 Fed. Reg. 31324-25 (1975). Corps Regulation
209.260(d) (2) (n) also provides: "'Freshwater wetlands' means those areas that are periodically inundated and that are normally characterized by the prevalence of vegetation that
requires saturated soil conditions for growth and reproduction." 40 Fed. Reg. 31324-25 (1975).
69 Statement of the Florida Departmental Regulation Before the Subcomm. on Water
Resources of the House Comm. on Public Works & Transp., 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1975).
70 Id.
71 See text accompanying notes 9-10 supra.
72 The Corps stated in its explanatory comments to the new regulations that it intended
to publish a list of fresh, brackish, and saltwater vegetation that can be used as one of the
indicators for determining the extent of the Corps' jurisdiction in wetland areas. 40 Fed. Reg.
31320 (1975).
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regulation."' This is a practical policy from an administrative and ecological
perspective, since these areas do not have any significant impact on the water
quality of larger areas. 4
Thus, the Corps' regulations achieve an expansion of the power to regulate
critical areas and the sources of pollution, and are of sufficient definiteness to
meet administrative and procedural requirements. Finally, as a further assurance
that all ecologically valuable areas are protected by the regulations, there is a
provision for discretionary regulation by the Corps. Where an unregulated area
is determined to be ecologically valuable, or an unregulated activity is considered
to be harmful and environmentally unsound, the Corps' district engineer may
impose controls on an ad hoc basis. 5
V. Major Criticisms and Deficiencies of
the Expansion of § 404 and Proposed Improvements
A. Agricultural Objections to the Expansion of the Corps, Jurisdiction
The most substantial criticism of the expansion of the Corps' § 404 jurisdiction as mandated by Calloway is based on its anticipated adverse impact in the
agricultural area. Opponents of the Corps' new regulations fear that the increase in the Corps' control of pollutants and discharge sources is so extensive
that § 404 will regulate many ordinary agricultural activities. Specifically, the
concern is that § 404 permits will be required for such common practices as
deepening an irrigation ditch, enlarging a stock pond, or plowing. 6
The anticipated delay, expense, and burden on farmers resulting from such
permit requirements have prompted numerous bills which would amend the
FWPCA to restore former limitations on § 404 regulatory powers. 7 Since the
majority of agricultural practices take place in nonnavigable areas, these bills
propose to eliminate control of agricultural activities under § 404 by restoring
the navigational limitation to the Corps' jurisdiction.'
The proposed legislation, however, is not necessary to correct agricultural
objections to the Corps' expanded jurisdiction. The new regulations promulgated
by the Corps do increase the Corps' power to regulate pollutant discharge under
73 See text accompanying note 61 supra
74 See text accompanying note 62 supra.
75 See Corps' Regulation 209.260(d) (2) (i), 40 Fed. Reg. 31325 (1975).
76 The Corps released a controversial press statement on May 6, 1975, which indicated
that such common agricultural activities as plowing could require a § 404 permit under the
expanded regulations. This press release was attacked as unfounded by various Congressmen.
121 CONG. REc. 3294 (daily ed. June 18, 1975) (extended remarks of Representative Moorhead); 121 CoNG. Rzc. 9761 (daily ed. June 5, 1975) (remarks of Senator Muskie); 121
CONG. REc. 4772 (daily ed. June 2, 1975) (remarks of Representative Ottinger). But see 121
CONG. REo. 5408 (daily ed. June 12, 1975) (remarks of Representative Bauman); 121 CONG.
REc. 9328 (daily ed. June 3, 1975) (remarks of Senator Dole).
77 See, e.g., S. 1843, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), introduced by Senator Dole, 121
CONG. REc. 9328 (daily ed. June 3, 1975); H.R. 7441, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), introduced
by Representative Long, 121 CONG. Rac. 4698 (daily ed. May 22, 1975); H.R. 7690, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), introduced by Representative Cochran, 121 CONG. REc. 5066 (daily
ed. June 12, 1975); H. R. 7859, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), introduced by Representative
Bauman, 21 CONG. Rlc. 5408 (daily ed. June 12, 1975).
78 Id.
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§ 404, but they also exempt most agricultural activities from such control. The
regulations contain two specific provisions which define regulable dredge and
fill materials in a manner which specifically excludes materials resulting from
normal farming, silvaculture, and ranching activities."9 In another provision, the
regulations exclude stock watering pools and basins from § 404 regulation by the
Corps." Thus, the regulations themselves preclude the Corps' control over most
agricultural areas.
These exemption provisions, however, do not completely eliminate all
agricultural regulation; the Corps may still regulate some agricultural activities
under § 404. For example, subsections (4) and (6) of the Corps' regulations,
which exclude normal farming, silvaculture, and ranching activities, are followed
by a sample list of specific activities which are excluded by that provision: "plowing, cultivating, seeding, harvesting for the production of food, fiber, and fiber
products.""1 The agricultural uses which are not automatically eliminated by
these provisions are uses which the Environmental Protection Agency, in its
supervisory capacity over § 404, has included in an interpretive table of uses
which are potentially regulable under the expanded definition of the Corps'
jurisdiction. These are dredging for irrigation supply, draining wetlands for land
reclamation, and filling in farm roads, fords, and bridges." These activities are
excludable from § 404 coverage under subsections (4) and (6) of the regulations to the extent that they can be classified as "normal" agricultural activities.
They are not included in the sample list of exclusions, however, and no further
definition is given of the term "normal agricultural activities" as it is used in the
Corps' regulations. It is therefore conceivable that such uses may not be considered "normal," thus requiring a § 404 permit.
Erosion prevention devices constitute a second area that is potentially
regulable under § 404. The regulations contain conflicting provisions on whether
agricultural techniques for preventing soil erosion are exempted from § 404
control. Subsection (6) expressly excludes from Corps control such filling
devices as "ripraps" and "groins" (sustaining walls of stone or soil built on an
embankment slope to prevent soil and sand erosion)."' However, subsection (7)
specifically includes "ripraps" and "groins" in its list of fill activities that are
regulable by the Corps under § 404.24 Consequently, the regulations leave unclear whether these two devices or any other agricultural filling technique for
preventing soil erosion fall within the Corps' § 404 jurisdiction.
These two examples indicate that the expansion of the Corps' jurisdiction
under § 404 could cover some common agricultural practices. The potential regulation of even a minority of agricultural activities should be eliminated from
79
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Corps' Regulations 209.260(d) (4), (d)(6)(i), 40 Fed. Reg. 31325 (1975).
Corps' Regulation 209.260(d) (2), (ii)(c), 40 Fed. Reg. 31325 (1975).
40 Fed. Reg.31325 (1975).
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the regulations; such agricultural areas were not intended to be covered by the
FWPCA. Three factors substantiate this assertion. First, the legislative history
of the FWPCA indicates that a number of Congressmen feared that undesirable
and extensive federal regulation of agriculture would result from the passage
of the Act. Legislative debate reveals that while no specific agricultural exemption was added to the FWPCA, the conferees indicated that the statutory
language did not and was not intended to regulate normal agricultural
practices.8"
Secondly, most agricultural activities are not regulated by other provisions
of the FWPCA. Although § 402 does regulate "point source" discharges s
(discharges which reach a water body through specific and discoverable routes),
most agricultural activities which result in discharges do not fall within this regulation, since many discharges of pollutants from agricultural activities cannot
be traced to their specific point of origin.8" Since these discharges are non-"point
source," no § 402 permit is required. Non-"point source" agricultural pollution
is unregulated by the remaining sections of the FWPCA. 8 Furthermore, the
Environmental Protection Agency, which administers the § 402 permit program,
has expressly excluded from regulation most pollutant discharges of ordinary
agricultural practices,
regardless of whether they are "point source," or non"point source." 89 Thus, provisions of the FWPCA apart from § 404 do not regulate pollutant discharges from normal agricultural activities,9" indicating that §
404 is also not intended to regulate these agricultural practices.
A third factor that evidences an intent not to regulate agricultural activities
under § 404 is administrative convenience and cost. With its present resources,
the Corps could not effectively administer a § 404 program expanded to include
agricultural discharges. It has been estimated that the total cost of administering
such an expanded § 404 program would be approximately $150 million and
would require the services of 7,000 additional employees.91 This administrative
burden would be accompanied by an approximate cost of $2 billion to farmers
who must apply for the permits, and an inestimable increase in processing
delays.9 2 This prohibitive burden, expense, and delay to both the Corps and
private individuals clearly indicates that such agricultural activities are not intended to be regulated by an expanded § 404.
85 See 1 Legislative History, supra note 20, at 427-28, 651-53 (1973).
86 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (Supp. II, 1972).
87 Hearings on H.R. 15596 and Related Bills Before the Subcomm. on Conservation and
Watershed Development of the House Comm. on Public Works & Transp., 92d Cong., 2d
Sess. 105-08 (1972); See generally Hines, Farmers, Feedlots and Federalism: The Impact
of the 1972 Water Pollution and Control Act Amendments on Agriculture, 19 S. DAK. L.
Rzv. 540 (1974); NRDC Statement, supra note 17; Statement of the National Livestock
Feeders Ass'n Before the Water Resources Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Public Works &
Transp., 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
88 38 Fed. Reg. 18003 (1973).
89 Hines, supra note 87, at 561-64. The major exception to the rule that agricultural
discharges are not regulated under § 402 is in the area of discharges from feedlots. The
FWPCA and its administering agency, the EPA, require National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits under § 402 for such discharges. Id. at 549-66.
90 Id.
91 See Statement of Honorable Gillis Long Before the Water Resources Subcomm. of the
House Comm. on Public Works & Transp., 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1975).
92 Id.
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Although the possibility of unintended control of agricultural activities
under § 404 should be eliminated from the Corps' regulation, legislation which
restores the traditional limits of navigability is not necessary to correct the
problem. Amending the regulations with specific language exempting such
activities and adding a more comprehensive list of specifically exempted agricultural activities would be sufficient.
B. A Comparison of § 404 and the Coastal Zone
Management Act: Illustration of § 404's Deficiencies
The major problem with the use of expanded Corps jurisdiction to achieve
wetlands control is that § 404 of the FWPCA was not initially enacted for the
specific purpose of wetlands control. Rather, § 404 was included in the FWPCA
in order to supplement the Corps' general powers to regulate dredging and
filling with a mandatory duty to assess and consider the environmental impact of
such operations. 3 Only the subsequent expansion of § 404 in accordance with
the Calloway order was specifically directed towards achieving greater wetlands
control.9" Since § 404 was not initially designed to implement extensive wetlands
control, it has several deficiencies in effecting that goal. These deficiencies are
best illustrated by a comparison of § 404 with the Coastal Zone Management Act
(CZMA)," a comprehensive federal statute which was specifically enacted for
the purpose of regulating coastal wetlands. Although the CZMA itself is generally not preferable to § 404 as a vehicle for wetlands control, CZMA does
illustrate that § 404 lacks several important features.
One important advantage of the CZMA is that it places the responsibility of
administering the regulatory program on a capable federal agency. The National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) was providently chosen to
implement the CZMA because of the technical competence required in administering a water-related coastal program.99 Since the CZMA was enacted for the
specific purpose of preserving and actively protecting coastal resources such as
wetlands, the Act designated an administering agency, the NOAA, which
possesses the requisite expertise and scientific knowledge to carry out that specific
function." In contrast, FWPCA § 404 was enacted for a more general purpose
of regulating the environmental impact of dredge and fill activities. 8 Yet, the
agency charged with administering § 404, the Army Corps of Engineers, does
not possess the same technical and scientific competence as the NOAA.
A second important feature of the CZMA which § 404 lacks is the great
amount of state participation that is afforded by the CZMA program. The
CZMA operates through state permit programs which meet uniform federal
93

See text accompanying notes 38-43 supra.

94 See text accompanying notes 12-26 supra.
95 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1451-64 (1974).

96 Comment, The Environmental Protection Agency and Coastal Zone Management:
Striking a Federal-StateBalance of Power in Land-Use Management, 11 HousToN L. Rlv.
1152, 1177 (1974). See Ludwigson, Coastal Zone Management, A Whole New Ball Game,
5 BNA ENVIRONMENTAL REP. Monograph 18 (1974).
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98

See notes 38-43 supra-.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[February 19761

standards and receive federal grants." Although the CZMA provides for federal approval, supervision, and funding, the actual administration of the coastal
wetlands regulation is primarily implemented through the state programs and
agencies."' In comparison, § 404 of the FWPCA allocates to the states a purely
advisory role, since the regulatory program is strictly enforced by the Corps."'
Although the Corps' regulations allow input from state programs, only the
federal government,
through the Corps, actually administers the § 404 permit
0 2
program.
The CZMA's greater use of state participation in a wetlands control
program is important because such land use regulation is traditionally reserved
to state government. The states' traditional powers to regulate the use of wetland
areas derive from the common law doctrine that the states hold title to the tidelands in trust for the public.'
This common law right was statutorily supplemented by the Submerged Lands Act of 1953, which gave to the states all the
power to regulate the use of submerged lands and waterbeds, subject only to
federal powers to protect navigation.' 4 Thus, state control of wetlands located
in tidal areas is firmly rooted both in common law and statutory bases. One clear
advantage of state control over wetlands is that the state can more readily adapt
and more specifically direct wetlands regulation to meet the particular geographic
needs of the state. Since each state has its own peculiar wetlands problems, it is
preferable for the federal government to defer whenever possible to state judgments in these areas." 5
Despite the CZMA's favorable features of a competent administering agency
and greater state participation in administering the permit program, the CZMA
is not more suitable than § 404 of the FWPCA as a vehicle for federal wetlands
control. The CZMA is seriously deficient for such a role in several respects. First,
the CZMA is an entirely voluntary program on the part of the states; the only
sanction provided for a state's failure to comply with the Act is termination of
federal aid.'
Thus, in a state where no federally approved program exists, the
CZMA permit program does not operate. Secondly, only coastal wetlands are
controlled under the CZMA.' 7 This exempts freshwater wetlands, which are
regulated under § 404 of the FWPCA, from the permit requirements of the
CZMA."' 8 The cost of remedying these two serious deficiencies of the CZMA
would be prohibitive, since the existing CZMA permit system would require ex99 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1454-55 (1974).
100 Id. at § 1456.
101 See Corps' Regulation 209.260(d) (2) (h), 40 Fed. Reg. 31324 (1975).
102 Id.
103 United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49 (1926); Baer v. Moran Bros. Co., 153
U.S. 287 (1894); Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324 (1876); Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.)
212 (1845); Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 366 (1842). See generally Ausness, A
Survey of State Regulation of Dredge and Fill Operations in Nonnavigable Waters, 8 LAND &
WATER L. Rv. 65 (1973); Kingham, supra note 16; Teclaff, supra note 16; Comment, Water
Recreation-Public Use of "Private Waters," 52 CALIF. L. REv. 171 (1969).
104 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-43 (1970).
105 See, e.g., Haskell, Land Use and the Environment: Public Policy Issues, 5 BNA ENVIRONMENTAL REP.
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16 U.S.C.A. § 1458 (1974).
Id. at § 1453(a).
Corps' Regulation 209.260(d)(2)(n), 40 Fed. Reg. 31325 (1975).
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tensive modification and expansion. Since § 404 of the FWPCA already provides
an established and uniform system of federal regulation, it is preferable to modify
the § 404 program to better meet the requirements of federal wetlands control.
C. Implementing Greater State Participationin a Wetlands Control Program
1. The Insufficiency of State Wetlands Programs Alone
As indicated, a serious deficiency of the use of § 404 for wetlands control
is the limited participation of the states. The choice of § 404 of the FWPCA
as the primary means of wetlands regulation contemplates a federally oriented
program. However, efforts to preserve wetland areas have not been confined to
the federal government. Both state and local governments have attempted
to regulate activities in wetland areas. At the present time, approximately 11
states have enacted statewide wetlands protection programs which are generally
administered by a professional employee or agency of the state. °9 Many other
states provide more limited regulation through coastal zone management
0
programs.1
However, a federally coordinated program for wetlands control is preferable
to individual state programs for several reasons. First, although some states do
have comprehensive regulations, the provisions of such acts vary according to the
state in terms of coverage and effectiveness."' One program, for example, does
not even have a regulatory permit system, but simply provides for general supervision of wetland areas." 2 Furthermore, the majority of states have no wetlands
program. Therefore, a federally coordinated program is necessary to ensure that
the programs for wetlands protection meet uniform standards and that such regulation is consistently administered for the preservation of wetlands in all states.
A second reason for preferring federal over state programs is that the basis
of federal power to regulate wetlands is more firmly established constitutionally.
State wetlands programs are enacted on the basis of police powers, and several
courts have invalidated such regulation as an unconstitutional exercise of that
power."' For example, in State v. Johnson,"' the supreme court of Maine held
109 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. ch 423, §§ 22a-28 to 22a-45 (1973); ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, §§ 4701-09 (1974); MD. ANN. CoDE §§ 9-101 to 9-501 (1974); MAss. ANN. LAWS
ch. 130, §§ 27A, 105 (1972); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 49-27-1 to 49-27-69 (Supp. 1975); N.H.
Rnv. STAT. ANr §§ 483-A:1 to 483-A:6 (Supp. 1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:9A-1 to
13:9A-10 (1975); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 2-1-13 to 2-1-25 (Supp. 1974); VA. CODE ANN.
ch. 2.1, §§ 62.1-13.1 to 62.1-13.20 (1975); RULES o FLORIDA DEPT. OF POLLUTION CONTROL: FLORmA ADMINSTRATrVE CODE ch. 17-4, §§ 17-4.02 to 17-4.28 (1975).
110 ALASKA STAT. §§ 46.03.110-240 (1971); CAL. WATER CODE §§ 13000-970 (West
1971); DEL. CODE ANN. fit. 7, §§ 7001-13 (1975); GA. CODE ANN. fit. 40, § 3519(1975);
WAsHr. REv. CODE ANN. tit. 90, §§ 58.010-930 (Supp. 1974).
111 Ausness, supra note 94, at 72-73.
112 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113-229(1975).
113 Bartlett v. Zoning Comm'n, 161 (Conn. 24, 282 A.2d 907 (1971); State v. Johnson, 265
A.2d 711 (Me. 1970); Commissioner of Natural Resources v. Vople & Co., 349 Mass. 104,
206 N.E.2d 666 (1965). See generally Dooley v. Town Plan & Zoning Comm'n, 151 Conn.
304, 197 A.2d 770 (1964); Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Parsippany-Troy Hills,
40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963). But see Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. Los Angeles, 57
Cal. 2d 515, 370 P. 2d 342, 20 Cal. Reptr. 638 (1962); CEEED v. California Coastal Zone
Conserv. Comm'n, 43 Cal. App. 3d 306, 118 Cal. Reptr. 315 (1974); Candlestick Properties,
Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Conserv. & Dev. Comm'n, 11 Cal. App. 3d 557, 89 Cal. Reptr. 897
(1970); Potomac Sand & Gravel Co. v. Governor of Maryland, 266 Md. 358, 293 A.2d 241
(1972); Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972).
114 256 A.2d 711 (Me.1970).
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that an application of that state's wetlands act which substantially destroyed the
value of the owner's land constituted an unlawful "taking" without compensation in violation of the due process clause of the United States Constitution."1
Federal regulation of wetlands which is based upon Congress' power under
the commerce clause is not subject to the same constitutional infirmities. The
courts have recognized that the power to regulate commerce unquestionably indudes the power to regulate activities resulting in water pollution which has a
serious effect on interstate commerce.'1 6
2. Delegation of Power to States Under a Federal § 404 Permit Program
Although problems of uniformity and constitutionality indicate the need for
federal regulation of wetlands, such regulation should be in cooperation with,
and not in substitution for, state regulation. As noted, it is preferable to allow
the state governments to retain the right to impose controls on the use of wetland
regions." 7 Furthermore, the use of greater state participation in implementing
wetlands regulation may compensate for the Corps' lack of specific technical and
scientific competence as compared to that of NOAA, since the individual state
agencies are more familiar with the specific problems and sources of wetlands
pollution that are endemic to the state region.
Although the expanded § 404 regulations of the Corps do give some consideration to state evaluations in processing permits, the state is allotted only an
advisory role. The Corps' regulations provide that as long as the policies and
requirements of the FWPCA have been considered, and in the absence of overriding national factors of public interest, the Corps should generally issue a
permit when a favorable state determination is rendered."' Although the
regulations provide for such state input, all decision-making powers for the issuance of a § 404 permit are retained by the Corps. Unfortunately this involves
a duplication of state and federal resources where the state already has an adequate wetlands regulation permit system.
A possible solution to this problem of duplication is the establishment of a
program under § 404 which delegates the authority to grant permits to states
which have federally approved permit programs. A similar approach under §
40219 of the FWPCA, which establishes the National Pollutant Discharge System,
provides a workable model. Under such a delegation program, the Corps could
authorize a state with an adequate program to issue § 404 permits. The Corps

115 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
116 Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971). See
generally United States v. Ashland Oil & Transp. Co., 504 F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1974);
United States v. Phelps Dodge, Civil No. CR-74-776-TUC-WCF (D. Ariz., Apr. 8, 1974).
117 See text accompanying notes 103-05 supra.
118 Corps' Regulation 209.260(f) (3) (iii), 40 Fed. Reg. 31327 (1975)_
119 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (Supp. II, 1972).
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would receive copies of state actions on all permit applications and would be
authorized to take corrective action where the state fails to administer
the pro2
grain in accordance with the requirements of the FWPCA.1 1
VI. Conclusion
The Corps' new regulations which were issued pursuant to Calloway expand
the federal role in environmental protection. Section 404 of the FWPCA has
been designated as the primary vehicle for implementing an extensive federal
program for the control of wetland areas. The Calloway court order forced the
expansion of the Corps' powers in order to adapt § 404 to this task. The expansion represents an acknowledgement that wetlands are ecologically critical areas
which are threatened by pollution and require federal protection.
The goal of federal wetlands protection is not at issue; the environmental
value of wetlands and the need for their preservation are readily affirmed by
courts and legislatures. Rather, it is the mechanism that has been chosen to
achieve wetlands control that is questioned. Generally, the expanded Corps
regulations under § 404 confer adequate power on the Corps to regulate and
protect wetlands from pollution. The new regulations define the Corps' jurisdiction in far broader terms than had prior regulations under the FWPCA and the
1899 Act.
However, several serious deficiencies in the § 404 regulations remain. The
threat of unintended regulation of common agricultural activities can be eliminated by a careful addition to the regulation which specifically exempts such
activities. The need for greater state participation under § 404 is a more difficult
problem. This may be solved by delegating the power to issue § 404 permits to
states with Corps-approved permit programs; this has already been accomplished
in the NPDES program under § 402 of the FWPCA. Such a change is necessary
to allow states to retain their traditional powers to regulate wetland disposition
so that individual problems of state areas can be solved.
Therefore, regardless of the major and minor criticisms and necessary
changes, the Corps' expanded regulations under § 404 provide a viable mechanism for federal wetlands control.
At the least, the Corps' § 404 expanded regulations enlarge the coverage
of wetland areas beyond the limitations of prior federal regulations and statutes.
Joanne M. Frasca
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